This was the most difficult project in our career, and I’m proud of this story of perseverance and ultimately preservation of capital. In a time where there is much negativity towards Syndications and multifamily, this story hopefully gives hope to the operators out there doing the right thing, giving every bit of smarts and execution to protect capital. This story is a save. I don’t know many other operators that would have been able to pull off what we did and the challenges we faced, how we survived and thrived. Our strength as GP guarantors at Sharpline, our track-record, our relationships with Freddie and Fannie were the key. It’s a testament to Sharpline and the commitment of our team as well as the patience and belief from our investors. I want this post to be a reality check and not considered bragadocious but give homage to the people in Sharpline and the many partners (lenders, vendors, consultants, investors) that helped get this insurmountable project to where it is today. Here we go. 3 years ago we bought this as a heavy value-add post covid. We couldn’t get new roofs that were leaking for 7 months, so this inhibited our reposition to improve the property, which kept some of the bad elements at the community there longer than we wanted. Fire property management company 1 , Fire property management company 2 (proverbial jump out frying pan into the fire, scary). Decided to self-manage project. This was in an early stage of our self-management journey about 2 years ago (we now self-manage 1500+ units). We purchase one half of the project with cash and the other with a bridge loan with floating rate debt (our only floating rate Sharpline has ever done, we didn’t buy a rate cap either, not smart) 4% bridge loan. We begin to execute capex plan successfully (we ripped the mansards off #MansardSlayer). The process of reposition took longer than we liked because of construction delays and bad PM companies, but we ultimately had the safety net of the 24 unit townhouse project that was getting higher occupancy that we purchased with cash as part of the syndication. So we refi’d the 24 unit with a local bank and GPs personally guaranteed the loan as we continued to do projects. This allowed us to free up liquid capital to continue executing to get higher occupancy, but we were still not there yet. We were at 65% overall occupancy on 128 units and the community was improving.

Hi, my name is Francisco Torres, everyone calls me Paco! I have had my real estate license in Northern Virginia for over 10 years, mostly just refferals/friends and family at this point as my real goal is a rental portfolio. I am currently doing a few short term lending deals for some fix and flippers and looking to invest the rest of my capital in multifamily deal. Looking for a smaller multifamily deal not so much of 200 unit syndication deal as I'm looking to start off small then build from there. I'm looking for 3k a month and have 100k to invest to get me there or as close as I can get. I would love to connect to any newbies or experienced investors. If anyone needs access to the MLS in Northern Virginia, Maryland, DC or Pennsylvania just let me know, I would love to contribute anyway I can!

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Interesting summary by Jay Parson on LinkedIn regarding a paper on how Institutional landlords in the are not the big bad wolf. They end up lower rents overall. Here are some key conclusions from Josh's research paper: 1) "Renters benefited from lower rents because institutional investors increased the rental supply by 0.58 homes for each home they purchased." With some nicely worded mythbusting, Josh writes: "These findings show that economies of scale, not market power, are the driving mechanism behind institutional investor impact in the single family rental market." In other words: Adding homes into the SFR market pushed rents LOWER than they'd otherwise be. But the investment can still be profitable because large investors with economies of scale reduce their costs, too. 2) While every home sold from an individual owner-occupant to an investor (of any size) removes inventory from the for-sale market, the impact is not as big as headlines lead you to believe. Institutional investors buying homes "lowered homeownership by less than expected because of supply." Specifically, the impact "decreased homeownership by 0.23 homes for each home purchased. The impact is not 1:1 due to supply responses: builders build and small landlords sell homes. Not accounting for supply leads to incorrectly estimating the impact by 4x." This is an important distinction that headlines and speechwriters often miss. You can't look at acquisitions alone. You have to look at net flows: acquisitions minus dispositions. Investors sold a lot -- particularly smaller "mom and pops," many of whom exited the SFR market over the last decade. (Additionally, Josh's paper goes into depth of correlation versus causation in regards to home price growth -- another simple yet common mistake in anti-rental analysis.) Furthermore, I'd add (my own point) that during the big buying spree of the early 2010s, investors were often looked at rescuers for underwater homeowners needing an exit. By 2016, the trends reversed. Homeownership nationally (and in high-institutional markets like Atlanta) rebounded substantially between 2016 and 2023 as individual buyers outmuscled investors. So when we analyze the impact of investors, this is why you could conclude investors contributed to home price appreciation (and equity recovery) in the 2010s, but played minimal role in the COVID-era surge as Freddie Mac research has showed.

I’d like to offer over the top value and I’m curious what people are looking for, you can either answer the questions here below in the pole or just comment.